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to overcome the stultifying stasis of the
huge Department of Defense bureaucracies—military and civilian—and the
mental inertia of fifty years of Cold War
thinking. As Scarborough notes,
“Rumsfeld’s task of reconfiguring the
military and fighting the war on terror
is so immense that it will take the light
of history to determine exactly what he
finally accomplished and at what he
failed.” If nothing else, Rumsfeld created, if not institutionalized, the state of
intellectual ferment that antecedes major change in any large organization.
Rumsfeld’s War is a quick, instructive
read from a pro-Rumsfeld perspective.
In that sense, it perhaps could be considered a counter to Bob Woodward’s
two recent “insider” books on the current war, for which Woodward received
very little support from Rumsfeld, and
in which Rumsfeld is not sympathetically depicted. On the downside, the
book stylistically feels somewhat as if
the author threw together some of his
day-to-day reporting text and called it a
book. Also, fully one-third of the book
consists of appendices, with copies of
various memos and papers, many classified “secret”; no military reader can
applaud the open use of such documents. However, the book is an interesting depiction of a remarkable man.
As Scarborough notes on the final
page, “It is hard to imagine any other
man to whom Bush could have turned
to fight this war with more tenacity,
panache, and, at the appropriate time,
good humor.”
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy
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Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Art of War. Edited and
translated by Christopher Lynch. Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 2003. 262pp. $25

Machiavelli’s classic, if now rarely read,
The Art of War was probably the single
most popular military treatise in Europe prior to Jomini—Clausewitz was a
professed admirer.
At first sight, this book, with its apparent attempt to revive the infantrycentered military organization of the
imperial Roman legions, seems hopelessly irrelevant to present concerns.
Even within its historical setting (it was
originally published in 1521),
Machiavelli’s work is often dismissed
today for its alleged failure to appreciate the social and technological
trends—particularly the growing importance of gunpowder—underpinning
the “revolution in military affairs” of
the sixteenth century. Christopher
Lynch makes an excellent case that such
interpretations neglect the literary or
rhetorical dimension of The Art of War
and its relationship to Machiavelli’s
larger intellectual project. In an extensive introduction, as well as an interpretive essay, Lynch rebuts the criticisms of
contemporary scholars, defends
Machiavelli’s grasp of the military realities of his own day, and reinterprets the
intention of the work in relation to
Machiavelli’s more famous political treatises, The Prince and Discourses on Livy.
Lynch’s key point is that Machiavelli
was not simply the backward-looking
admirer of Rome he is often taken to be
but a revolutionary thinker who combined elements of past military and political systems in a novel synthesis. His
apparent reliance on Roman models is
to be understood fundamentally as a
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rhetorical device designed to appeal to
the prejudices of the humanist-oriented
Italian elite of his day. At the military
level, Lynch argues that Machiavelli’s
appreciation of the role of artillery and
cavalry has long been underestimated.
Machiavelli goes out of his way to call
attention to the limitations of the Roman way of warfare, which was evident
in their campaigns against the
Parthians, who relied exclusively on
light mobile cavalry armed with the
bow and guerilla-style raiding tactics.
Lynch suggests that what Machiavelli ultimately envisions is a synthesis of Rome
or “Europe” and “Asia,” a combination
of Clausewitzian commitment to the decisive battle and extensive employment
of maneuver, deception, and surprise in
a manner reminiscent of Sun Tzu.
Whatever view one takes of Lynch’s
bold and provocative reading of
Machiavelli’s text, his handling of the
translation is exemplary and unlikely to
be challenged in the foreseeable future.
He makes use of the definitive critical
edition of the Italian text published in
Rome in 2001, which removes many
errors present in older versions. The
translation itself is relatively literal, with
occasional awkwardness but much enhanced access to the terminology of
Machiavelli himself; there is also a very
extensive glossary of terms.
CARNES LORD

Naval War College

Singer, Peter W. Corporate Warriors. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2003. 330pp. $35

Corporate Warriors is a must read for
military professionals and national security experts. It opens a dialogue to a
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valuable aspect of national security that
demands greater attention—the armed
forces’ use of contractors. The framework Singer develops is especially
worthwhile, and although many of his
suggestions are often provocative, in
some areas his analysis is flawed and the
implications are loose and unsupported. Overall, however, this work is a
superb effort to advance discussion on a
critical topic.
The Bush administration has made it
clear that even with the demands related to the global war on terror, it
would prefer not to dramatically increase the size of its forces. To make up
for the difference—particularly with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq—contractors have been hired to pick up the
slack. Hence, the current war is one
where corporate warriors of private
military firms have become part of the
environment.
Throughout the world other states and
international organizations have also
turned to private military firms for assistance. Singer argues persuasively that
there are policy and operational concerns about the use of these firms that
need to be examined more thoroughly.
The book is divided into three parts, of
which the first two are the most useful
and of durable value. “The Rise” contains an interesting thumbnail of mercenaries through the ages and sets the
context for understanding contemporary motivations for the use of private
military firms. “Organization and Operations” provides an exceptionally
useful framework for understanding the
roles of various private firms that perform duties often identified with the
military. Chapter 6, “The Private Military Industry Classified,” lays out the
taxonomy for firms involved in
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